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Abstract
This article examines the development of campaigns against “gender ideology” in Europe, leading to the emergence of a
specific family ofmobilizations thatwe call anti-gender campaigns. These campaigns, started in themid-1990s as a Catholic
project in reaction to the results of the UN conferences of Cairo and Bejing, but developed significantly in several Euro-
pean countries after crucial encounters with right-wing populism. While recognizing the importance of these crossovers,
we contend the interpretation that mobilizations against “gender ideology” and right-wing populism are the two faces of
the same coin, andwe plead for amore complex understanding of theways inwhich distinct—and sometimes competing—
projects can converge in specific settings. We argue that research on the “Global RightWing” should therefore disentangle
the various components of this phenomenon, and locate them in concrete settings. We show that this research strategy
allows us to better grasp the specificities of each project and the ways in which they interact. Opening our eyes on crucial
developments in contemporary Europe, this strategy also prevents researchers from falling into the trap of a global and
unqualified backlash against everything achieved in terms of gender and sexuality in the last decades.
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1. Introduction
In September 2017, EuroNGOs, the network of Euro-
pean NGOs for Sexual and Reproductive Health and
Rights, Population and Development, convened the or-
ganization’s annual meeting in Brussels under the theme
Re: Frame. Promoting SRHR in a time of growing pop-
ulism. The aim was to “challenge thinking and stimu-
late debate around the rise of populism, its impact on
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights issues and
how to respond to this changing context” (EuroNGOs,
2017). Two months later, European Commissioners Tim-
mermans and Jourová dedicated the EU annual collo-
quium on fundamental rights to the study of “women’s
rights in turbulent times” (European Commission, 2017).
The objective was to reflect, in presence of government
representatives from all Members states, “on the rela-
tionship between strong fundamental rights for women,
and resilient democratic societies”, including the “shrink-
ing space for civil society” and the increasingly hostile cli-
mate in specificMember states. These two events, which
followed each other very closely, are good indicators of
the current climate among European policy-makers1 and
by no means exceptions in the region. They translate
1 One of the authors was a speaker at both events.
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growing concern for the fate of liberal democracy and
fears that fundamental rights might be under threat.
A similar trend is observed in the academic litera-
ture, with a rapid development of research on opposi-
tion to gender and sexual rights in Europe (e.g. Avanza
& Della Sudda, 2017; Bracke & Paternotte, 2016a; Bro-
qua & Fillieule, 2018; Graff & Korolczuk, 2018; Gutiérrez
Rodríguez, Tuzcu, &Winkel, 2018; Hark &Villa, 2015; Köt-
tig, Bitzan, & Petö, 2017; Kováts & Põim, 2015; Krook,
2015; Kuhar, 2015; Kuhar& Paternotte, 2017; Paternotte,
van der Dussen, & Piette, 2016; Verloo, 2018). Several of
these works rely on the idea of a global backlash against
gender equality and sexual rights (Faludi, 1991; Mans-
bridge & Shames, 2008), with powerful actors joining
forces to oppose the rights of women and LGBT people.
Most of the time, these threats are lumped together,
merging phenomena as diverse as populism, far right par-
ties, religious fundamentalism, nationalism, racism, ne-
oliberalism or austerity politics. These are often gath-
ered under the broad umbrella term of “Global Right”,
which identifies right-wing actors in opposition to the ad-
vocates of progressive causes (with whom they generally
interact) and echoes the idea of a globalization of US cul-
ture wars (Bob, 2012). In current debates on women’s
and LGBT rights, it expresses the feeling that the “Right”
is on the rise everywhere, and represents a threat for lib-
eral democracy and fundamental rights (e.g., Graff, Ka-
pur, &Walters, in press; Gutiérrez Rodríguez et al., 2018;
Roth, 2018).
Against such an alarmist reading, we argue that schol-
ars should not be blinded by the spectacular manifesta-
tions of opposition faced in the last years or by the vari-
ous victories recently won by these actors. They should
rather engage, we contend, with the complexity of these
oppositional dynamics and be careful about the concepts
they use. This implies fine-grained theoretical and empir-
ical work to better understandwhat is exactly at stake, as
well asmeticulous comparative research not to overstate
what could be context-specific.
To substantiate this claim, we discuss the emergence
and the development of anti-gender campaigns in Eu-
rope. In recent years, this region has indeed faced nu-
merous attacks on women’s and LGBT rights. Intriguingly,
most of these mobilizations regard “gender” as the ma-
trix of the various policy reforms they combat in specific
countries. As will be explained, these campaigns form a
specific type of conservative opposition to gender and
sexual equality, which needs to be distinguished from
other actors in Europe today.
Following Verloo’s emphasis on the variety of opposi-
tions to gender equality in contemporary Europe (2018,
pp. 215–216), we argue that concepts such as the so-
called “Global Right” should be disentangled at a the-
oretical and empirical level, as well as located in con-
crete settings. More precisely, using the example of anti-
gender campaigns in Europe, we show that recent forms
of resistance should not be conflated with each other,
although they may sometimes crucially intersect. These
are often competing projects, which involve different
types of actors and originate from historically different
roots. In other words, what could at first sight look alike
may proceed from distinct—and potentially competing
or divergent—endeavors, and researchers should inves-
tigate how these projects can suddenly converge de-
spite sometimes fundamental disagreement instead of
regarding them as two components of the same ideolog-
ical block.
This article is organized as follows: we first present
anti-gender activism in Europe and discuss its historical
roots, its discursive underpinnings, the policy issues it
combats and its repertoire of action. Second, we trace
the origins of this project back to the Roman Catholic
Church. Third, we discuss the impact of the current right-
wing populist wave on European anti-gender campaigns.
Finally, we explain why, despite the decisiveness of such
encounters, both projects should not be conflated. This
piece relies on a recent project comparing these mobi-
lizations in thirteen European countries, carried out be-
tween 2014 and 2017 (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017).2
2. Anti-Gender Campaigns in Contemporary Europe3
Although anti-gender campaigns4 only became widely
visible in recent years, they started in the mid-2000s.
Spain appears as the earliest case in Europe: the Catholic
Church, conservative groups and political parties mobi-
lized against the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zap-
atero and the same-sex marriage bill from 2004 (Aguilar
Fernández, 2010, 2013). Early mobilizations have also
been identified in Croatia (2006, mobilizations against
sex education), Italy (2007, mobilizations against same-
sex civil partnership) and Slovenia (2009, mobilization
against marriage equality) (Cornejo & Pichardo, 2017;
Garbagnoli, 2016, 2017; Kuhar, 2015).
2 This article builds upon the findings of a project on anti-gender campaigns in Europe funded by the Budapest and the Brussels Offices of the Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung (2014–2017), as well as by the Université libre de Bruxelles and the Belgian Fonds national de la recherche scientifique (grant J.0115.16).
Chaired by the authors, it covers 13 European countries: Austria (Stefanie Mayer and Birgit Sauer), Belgium (Sarah Bracke, Wannes Dupont and David
Paternotte), Croatia (Amir Hodžić and Aleksandar Štulhofer), France (Michael Stambolis-Ruhstorfer and Josselin Tricou), Germany (Paula-Irene Villa),
Hungary (Eszter Kováts and Andrea Pető), Ireland (Mary McAuliffe and Sinéad Kennedy), Italy (Sara Garbagnoli), Poland (Agnieszka Graff and Elżbieta
Korolczuk), Portugal (Alberta Giorgi), Russia (Kevin Moss), Slovenia (Roman Kuhar) and Spain (Monica Cornejo and J. Ignacio Pichardo). Although re-
searchers did not adopt a common methodology, they applied the same analytical grid and converged around a limited number of questions. Results
have been published in English and in French (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017). Here, the aim is not to provide the reader with a summary of empirical
findings, but to discuss the way oppositional movements are usually approached in the literature on Europe.
3 Parts of this section rely on the introduction and the conclusion of Paternotte and Kuhar (2017).
4 In most countries, these mobilizations are the result of collective action, explaining why we sometimes use the term “anti-gender movements”. How-
ever, as Russian campaigns have been engineered directly from the Kremlin and are increasingly part of public policy in Poland, Hungary and Italy, the
term “campaigns” also encompasses these newer developments.
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Most mobilizations, however, started in the 2010s,
and 2012 appears as a tipping point, which corresponds
to the climax of the “Manif pour Tous”, the massive
French mobilization against same-sex marriage (Pater-
notte, 2015). This movement managed to bring thou-
sands of demonstrators in the streets of Paris and various
other French cities for more than two years, and it has
significantly impacted policy-making on issues related to
gender and sexuality (Paternotte, 2018; Perreau, 2016). In
a country generally associated with sexual liberalism and
secularism, this unexpected success appeared as a major
victory, which could therefore be emulated elsewhere.
From this moment, similar mobilizations spread
across the region, in countries as different as Germany,
Italy, Poland, Russia or Slovakia. These mobilizations
were all triggered by a specific policy debate, which vary
cross-nationally, and can occur as a reaction to a con-
crete policy proposal (such as in France, where protests
by the “Manif pour tous” were organized as a reaction
to François Hollande’s pledge to introduce same-sexmar-
riage) or as a form of prophylaxis against claims and poli-
cies that could emerge in the future. This happened for
instance in Croatia (Hodžič & Štulhofer, 2017) and in Slo-
vakia (Smrek, 2015), where anti-gender movements an-
ticipated possible bills on marriage equality and called
for a constitutional referendum to change their national
constitutions before LGBT activists and their allies could
move forward. Interestingly, despite the fact that some
differences can be accredited to the historical and politi-
cal contexts of post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe,
the East-West divide does not offer a particularly useful
analytical lens.
Although the triggers vary across borders, a common
patternmay be identified: thesemobilizations share a cri-
tique of gender, labeled as “gender ideology”, “gender
theory” or “(anti)genderism”. They all claim to combat
“gender”, which is seen as the root of their worries and
the matrix of the reforms they want to oppose. There-
fore, following an emic approach (Avanza, 2018), we call
these mobilizations anti-gender campaigns to insist on
the specificity of this wave of opposition, in compari-
son with other forms of opposition to gender and sex-
ual equality. The identification of a common enemy by
these activists allows us to bring together mobilizations
which could otherwise look like separate national events.
These striking resemblances are illustrated by the logos
of these movements (Figure 1), which can ultimately be
counted down to only two different symbols. These com-
monalities are further attested by the observation of
cross-border patterns of mobilization, which include a
common discourse, a traveling repertoire of action, and
similar strategies, which are presented in the remainder
of this section along with the main areas of discontent.
2.1. What Do Campaigners Mean by “Gender Ideology”?
“Gender ideology”, or even more so “gender theory”,
should not be confused with the scholarship developed
in the field of gender studies, but is a term initially cre-
ated to oppose women’s and LGBT rights activism as well
as the scholarship deconstructing essentialist and nat-
uralistic assumptions about gender and sexuality. Eras-
ing fierce controversies within gender and sexuality stud-
ies and the complex interplay between activism and the
academy, it operates as a powerful interpretive frame.
According to its opponents, “gender ideology” is the ide-
ological matrix of the different reforms they try to op-
pose, which pertain to intimate/sexual citizenship de-
bates, including LGBT rights, reproductive rights, and sex
and gender education.
Figure 1. Logos of anti-gender campaigns in Europe (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017, p. 269).
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“Gender ideology”, however, is not only regarded as
an anthropological and epistemological threat but also
as a covert political strategy, a sort of conspiracy aimed
at seizing power and imposing deviant and minority val-
ues on average people. Anti-gender ideologues often in-
voke George Orwell’s concept of “newspeak”, and accuse
feminists, LGBT activists and gender scholars of manip-
ulating language and hiding their objectives behind a
democratic sounding language of equality and human
rights (Lopez Trujillo, 2005, p. 8). They claim that gender
studies are a theory of power, and question the very no-
tion of democracy, articulating knowledge production to
political enterprises. They pretend therefore to uncover
the underpinnings of the nice language about (gender)
equality, warning fellow citizens about its dangers.
Anti-gender theorists also claim that popular will has
been confiscated by corrupt elites, and argue that “gen-
der ideology” is a new form of totalitarianism, which
would be more dangerous than Marxism and Fascism
(Anatrella, 2011; Kuby, 2012, 2016; Schooyans, 1997,
2000). Kuby argues for instance that “totalitarianism
has made a costume change and now appears in the
mantle of freedom, tolerance, justice, equality, anti-
discrimination and diversity—ideological backdrops that
prove to be amputated, distorted terms” (Kuby, 2016,
p. 12). Some also depict “gender ideology” as a new left-
ist ideology invented on the ashes of communism (Con-
treras & Poole, 2011). According to them, the achieve-
ment of socialism remains the goal of the revolution, but
it can no longer be reached only through social revolu-
tion, as the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
has clearly showed. This argument resonates particularly
well in post-Socialist European countries, where gender
theory is often classified as newMarxism (Cestnik, 2013).
In some contexts, “gender ideology” is also inter-
preted as imposed by the West on the rest of world. Of-
ten understood as a symptom of the depravation of Eu-
roAmerica, it is seen as a neocolonial project through
which Western activists and their governments try to
export their decadent values and to secularize non-
Western societies (Alzamora Revoredo, 2005, p. 559;
Peeters, 2013, p. 79; Sarah, 2013, p. 4; for a critical anal-
ysis, Graff & Korolczuk, 2018). International institutions
like the UN or the EU and private funders such as the
Open Society or the Ford Foundation are accused of play-
ing a central part in this process, especially by forcing
poorer and less influential countries to accept morally
problematic laws and regulations in exchange for sup-
port and money. This is the reason why, for instance,
Pope Francis prefers the expression “ideological coloniza-
tion” when he refers to “gender ideology”, and several
Vatican documents, especially in the context of the two
Synods on the family, fustigate Western attempts to in-
termingle in the national policies of countries from the
Global South (Bracke & Paternotte, 2016b).
2.2. What Is Combatted
Depending on the country, anti-gender campaigners
have combatted LGBT rights, reproductive rights, sex and
gender education in schools, gender itself (as meant in
gender violence, gender studies and gendermainstream-
ing), as well as mobilized in defense of religious freedom
and a certain understanding of democracy. These five ar-
eas of cross-national contention are detailed below.
(1) Debates around same-sex marriage and civil part-
nership appear as the most powerful triggers across the
region. Related issues include fierce debates on second-
parent and joint same-sex adoption, surrogacy, and re-
productive technologies and similar concerns about ac-
cess to kinship by (gay and lesbian) individuals and same-
sex couples. Often, anti-gender activists claim they de-
fend the best interest of the child against the “egoistic
wishes and desires” of adults, and warn citizens against
a slippery slope: same-sex marriage would necessary
lead to more controversial policy reforms in a near fu-
ture, and to an anthropological revolution because it de-
nies motherhood and fatherhood, negates sexual differ-
ences and gender complementarity and thereby elim-
inates “the anthropological basis of the family” (Pope
Francis, 2016, p. 56).
While lesbian and gay rights are the forefront tar-
gets of anti-gender movements, transgender rights have
rarely been attacked, even when the issue was discussed
in Parliament, as in 2016 in France. Yet, a few exceptions
can be identified, such as the 2015 Slovenian referen-
dum campaign, during which transgender people were
objectified as the ultimate goal of gender ideologists, or
the 2017 campaign by the Spanish group HazteOir, which
attempted to drive around a bus covered with the sign
“Boys have penises. Girls have vulvas. Don’t let them
lie to you”. A similar version of the bus, called the Free
Speech Bus, later drove around Manhattan and other lo-
cations in the United States, as well as in Nairobi and
in various Latin American countries Mexico, Chile, etc.)
(Holden, 2017).
(2) Reproductive rights were historically at the roots
of the discourse on “gender ideology”, and issues like
abortion, contraception and reproductive technologies
remain at the center of the debate (Grabowska, 2014;
Heinen, 2013), as shown by Spanish debates on the abor-
tion law in 2011 and the 2016 proposal of the Polish rul-
ing Law and Justice (PiS) party to ban abortion. Reproduc-
tive rights, particularly abortion, are interpreted as being
part of what Jean-Paul II called the “culture of death” and
as such in opposition to the “culture of life” promoted by
the Church (Grzebalska & Soós, 2016; Vaggione, 2012).5
(3) Sex and gender education in schools appear as an-
other crucial area of discontent. Since 2006, Croats have
been discussing different modules of sexual education,
in which gender equality and homosexuality appear to
5 Abortion is sometimes connected to euthanasia through the notion of “culture of death”. While the issue is not discussed in most countries under
study, this is the main terrain of the small Belgian anti-gender movement (Voyé & Dobbelaere, 2015).
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be contentious issues (Bijelić, 2008; Hodžić, Budesa, Štul-
hofer, & Irvine, 2012; Hodžić & Štulhofer, 2017; Kuhar,
2015). Similarly, French mobilizations started with a dis-
cussion about the insertion of “gender” in textbooks in
2011 (Béraud, 2013). In all these cases, opponents invoke
the figure of the innocent child and claim that “gender
ideology” has severe consequences on children’s devel-
opment, not the least by blurring anthropological refer-
ences about the sexes. Furthermore, such education and
alleged promotion of “sexual permissiveness” is seen as
encouraging the hypersexualization of children.
(4) Gender itself has been under discussion. In addi-
tion to debates on the notion itself, three issues directly
connected to gender relations have been targeted: gen-
der violence, gender mainstreaming, and gender studies.
Although these are intrinsically different issues, they all
aim at transforming unequal gender relations and are ac-
cused of being covert vehicles of “gender ideology” be-
cause of their use of the word “gender”. Polish debates
on “gender ideology” started in 2012 in opposition to
the ratification of the Council of Europe Istanbul Con-
vention on preventing and combating violence against
women and domestic violence (Graff, 2014). In Slovenia
or Bulgaria, anti-gender activists have similarly claimed
that this Convention would turn “gender ideology” into
the official ideology of the state. Spain has experienced
comparable debates, with opponents suggesting the use
of expressions like “domestic violence” or “intimate part-
ner violence” to avoid the abhorred term “gender”.
Gender mainstreaming was at the core of the de-
bate in Germany and Austria. According to activists, it
is a totalitarian ideology and a non-democratic practice,
imposed on European countries by the feminist lobbies
and elites from Brussels. As claimed by the German anti-
gender activist Gabriele Kuby:
For the first time in history, power elites are claiming
authority to change men’s and women’s sexual iden-
tity through political strategies and legal measures.
They had previously lacked expertise in social engi-
neering. However, today this is happening before our
eyes on a global scale. The strategy’s name: gender
mainstreaming. The battle is being fought under the
banner of equality of men and women, but that has
proven to be a tactical transitional stage. (2016, p. 42)
Gender was finally discussed in connection to gender
studies and the existence of gender curricula and gen-
der departments at universities. Often brushed aside
as a waste of public money, gender studies are con-
structed as ideological and non-scientific, and the anti-
gender project appears as a struggle over the legitimacy
of knowledge production. In fact, anti-gender campaigns
can be read as a project of alternative knowledge produc-
tion, which aims to dismantle post-structural research
in social sciences and humanities in particular as these
are not in line with allegedly unquestionable findings of
natural sciences, particularly biological, medical and psy-
chological studies about essential differences between
male and female sex (including differences in male and
female brains) and complementarity of male and female
sexes. This has had severe outcomes in several countries.
In France for instance, the region of Ile-de-France has dis-
mantled its crucial financial support to gender studies. In
2018, the Hungarian government has threatened teach-
ing programs in gender studies.
(5) Campaigners claim that democracy as such
is endangered as they equate “gender ideology”—
particularly in post-socialist Europe—with (new) Marx-
ism and the communist political regime in order to em-
phasize its undemocratic character. More recently, these
actors have claimed that they defend religious freedom
and denounce rising forms of “christianophobia” in Eu-
rope, for instance by forcing Catholics to act or speak
against their conscience and their beliefs. In order to sup-
port their claims they often make explicit connections
to the situation of Christians in the Middle East (Eber-
stadt, 2016).
2.3. How Do They Fight?
As indicated by our study across 13 countries in Europe,
these campaigns share a distinctive repertoire of action
as well as a specific set of strategies, which are crucial to
their identity and specificity. Protests display a colorful,
youthful and festive outlook, far away from stereotypi-
cal images of conservativemobilizations and reminiscent
of Pride Parades or techno music gatherings. Through
this, anti-gender campaigners try to build a pluralizing
(and secularizing) self-image against the religious or con-
servative imagery often conveyed in public opinions. It
projects itself as a rational, moderate and commonsen-
sical actor, who raises its voice because things have sim-
ply “gone too far”. Often, this movement also uses a self-
victimization strategy, presenting itself as the true de-
fender of oppressed people, of amajority who is silenced
by powerful lobbies and elites, as well as the savior of na-
tional authenticity against international powers. These
choices are instrumental in hiding the religious and polit-
ical origins of the movement, while indicating a modern-
ization and a professionalization of conservative activism
in Europe (Datta, 2018).
The repertoire of action includes demonstrations,
stand-ins and sit-ins, petitions and the collection of sig-
natures, litigation, expertise and knowledge production,
lobbying, referendum campaigns, electoral mobilization,
party politics (including the establishment of new politi-
cal parties), incitement to vigilance and ad hominem ex-
posure campaigns in schools and hospitals. Anti-gender
activists are extremely active on the web and take ad-
vantage of the possibilities offered by new information
and communication technologies. Their online activities
are multidimensional and go far beyond a mere informa-
tive function (Tricou, 2015). This active presence on the
web does not mean that the movement does not target
traditional media. The organization of events, lectures,
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preparation of statements and press conferences are all
targeted towards traditionalmedia outlets (Garbagnoli &
Prearo, 2017). Anti-gender campaigns also include exten-
sive lobbying, both at national and transnational level.
Finally, the recurring usage of the image of an inno-
cent and endangered child appears as a mechanism for
triggering moral panic (Thompson, 1998). By seeking to
produce a moral panic, anti-gender activists try to legit-
imize their particular claims, establish the validity of the
issues raised, stir up concern among the general popu-
lation and attract media attention. They present their
claims in terms of good versus evil and use specific exam-
ples to present them as general (Goode & Ben-Yehuda,
2009). This strategy is reminiscent of the early anti-gay
rights movements in the United States, such as the 1977
“Save Our Children” campaign led by Anita Bryan (Fejes,
2008, p. 99).
3. A Catholic Strategy
“Gender ideology” is not only an analytical frame, but
also a political strategy. As such, it should not only be
read as a reaction to social transformations, but also as
a political project. As documented by numerous scholars
and activists (Buss, 1998, 2004; Buss & Herman, 2003;
Butler, 2006; Case, 2011, 2016; Chappel, 2006; Garbag-
noli & Prearo, 2017; Girard, 2007, p. 334; Swiebel, 2016),
it has a history, and its presence has been reported in
other parts of the world (Bracke & Paternotte, 2016a).
This discourse was elaborated in Catholic circles in the
mid-1990s as a response to the recognition of sexual and
reproductive rights in the UN rights system at the 1994
UN conference on Population and Development in Cairo
and the 1995 Beijing conference onWomen. At the time,
the Holy See attempted to oppose the notion of gender
because it feared that it would become, along with the
institutionalization of sexual and reproductive rights, a
vehicle for the international recognition of abortion, ad-
ditional attacks on traditional motherhood and a legit-
imization of homosexuality. The Holy See hence inter-
preted the results of Cairo and Beijing as a major defeat.
As highlighted by this literature, the notion of “gen-
der ideology” was designed to become an important el-
ement of the counter-strategy mounted by the Vatican
and its allies. It turns the notion of gender into the ide-
ological matrix of a set of abhorred ethical and social re-
forms, and provides the Vatican with an interpretative
frame which connects different sorts of actors under the
frame of a gender conspiracy (Peeters, 2013). Relying
on the Gramscian theory of cultural hegemony (Brustier,
2014; Peeters, 2011, p. 221), this strategy also aims at
propagating alternative ideas by using and subverting
the notions it repudiates in order to contest the sup-
posed cultural and political hegemony of “postmodern
gender”. The Church has reclaimed progressive notions
such as gender or feminism to change their meaning, re-
signifying what liberal voices have been trying to artic-
ulate over the last decades. These efforts led in 2003 to
the publication of the Lexicon: Ambiguous andDebatable
Terms Regarding Family Life and Ethical Questions by
the Pontifical Council for the Family with the support of
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. This offi-
cial document, which resembles a dictionarywith entries
on a wide range of ethical topics (including several on
gender), aims at reclaiming the true meaning of words.
This strategy connects to crucial debates in contem-
porary Catholicism (Bracke & Paternotte, 2016b; Case,
2016). It builds upon John Paul II’s theology of the body
(Carnac, 2013a, 2013b; Case, 2011, 2016; Favier, 2014;
Garbagnoli, 2014, 2016; Garbagnoli & Prearo, 2017) and
New Feminism (Couture, 2012) while echoing his dis-
course on the “culture of death”. It also mirrors Cardinal
Ratzinger’s anxieties about the propagation of hedonism,
laicism, relativism and individualism inWestern societies
(Ratzinger & Messori, 1985). “Gender ideology” should
nevertheless not be understood as a mere attempt to
set John Paul II’s and Benedict XVI’s theologies in mo-
tion. The Catholic Church has been instrumental in the
emergence and the development of the notion of “gen-
der ideology” both as an answer to the interrogations of
the Vatican and as a strategy of action. As these scholars
have shown and as the burgeoning literature on these
mobilizations on the ground is currently documenting, its
role cannot be circumscribed to a laboratory of ideas, for
the Church has also offered a space where intellectuals
and activists could meet and exchange views and strate-
gies, and has provided a powerful mobilization and diffu-
sion network.
Moreover, anti-gender campaigns must be located
within wider priorities of the Vatican, particularly the
project of New Evangelization (Aguilar Fernández, 2011;
Béraud & Portier, 2015; Paternotte, 2017; Tricou, 2016).
This project, which was initiated by the same actors un-
der Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI, is an attempt by
the Church to regain its influence in secularizing parts of
the world (among which Europe is central), and to reaf-
firm the faith of its followers. Against a privatization of re-
ligion, it insists on the public role of religion, inviting lay
Catholics to defend their ideas publicly and to mobilize
into politics and onto the streets. The evangelizing role of
the family and the importance of its defense by political
authorities are often emphasized, and new technologies,
especially the Internet, must be explored as new evange-
lization devices. Lay believers are crucial in this endeavor,
and key actors include new ecclesial communities such
as the Opus Dei, the Charismatic Renewal or the Neocat-
echumenal Way, which are also mobilized against “gen-
der ideology”.
Having said this, numerous factors mitigate the suc-
cess of this offensive on the ground and it would be mis-
leading to picture the emergence of this social move-
ment as a campaign entirely engineered from the Vat-
ican. Anti-gender mobilizations did not happen every-
where in the Catholic world and did not happen with
the same intensity. Moreover, Catholics are not the main
driving force behind thismovement everywhere, and the
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actual cooperation between anti-gender movement and
the Roman Catholic Church varies significantly, depend-
ing on the current (moral) position of the Church and
its historic role in each country. The factors that explain
the influence of the Catholic Church on national poli-
tics include the nature of the relations between Rome
and the national Church, the divisions within the Church
in each country, the specific pattern of state-church
relations (Dobbelaere & Pérez-Agote, 2015; Gryzmala-
Busse, 2015; Manuel, Reardon, & Wylcox, 2006; Pérez-
Agote, 2012), past legacies like the involvement of the
Church under authoritarian regimes and the association
between Catholicism and the construction of the nation
(Ayoub, 2016; Gryzmala-Busse, 2015). The role of the
Church varies from very few connections to the move-
ment in Germany to closely intertwined collaborations,
where the Church is a key actor in the movement, such
as in Poland or Italy and to a certain extent in Spain
and Croatia.
4. The Impact of Right-Wing Populism
Several scholars have pinpointed striking resonances be-
tween right-wing populism and anti-gender mobiliza-
tions (e.g., Chetcuti-Osorovitz & Teicher, 2016; Graff &
Korolczuk, 2018; Grzebalska & Soós, 2016; Hark & Villa,
2015; Kemper, 2016; Köttig et al., 2017; Kováts & Põim,
2015), as well as right-wing populist attacks on gender
and the role of gender in right-wing populism more gen-
erally (Norocel, 2013; Scrinzi, 2014; Spierings, Zaslove,
Mugge, & de Lange, 2015). In such accounts, anti-gender
campaigns are sometimes presented as another element
of the right-wing populist wave that Europe is currently
facing, especially in activism and policy circles. Two ele-
ments are often emphasized by these scholars: on the
one hand, populism as a distinctive political style, a spe-
cificway of doing politics and, on the other hand, the con-
servative nature of the claims, which often posits anti-
gender campaigns on the right of the political spectrum.
Our project confirms that the current right-wing populist
wave has decisively contributed to the success of anti-
gender campaigns in Europe. In several countries, it has
allowed anti-gender campaigns (originally a handful of
people in many places) to grow significantly and to res-
onate more broadly in European societies. The vague no-
tion of “gender ideology” or “gender theory”, with all
it involves, appears as a cement which binds together
various actors who might not share the same ideologi-
cal stands across all issues they address (Kováts & Põim,
2015), while populism offers a springboard allowing the
anti-gender cause to appeal to a much wider audience.
This observation reminds Mudde’s idea of populism as a
“thin-centered ideology” (2004, p. 543), as this political
scientist insists on the capacity of populism as an ideol-
ogy to be combined with other ideological tenets.
More precisely, findings show that anti-gender cam-
paigns resonate with right-wing populism in four differ-
ent ways. First, in some countries, right-wing populists
are among the main drivers of anti-gender campaigns.
This is for instance the case in Germany and Austria (Hark
& Villa, 2015; Kemper, 2016; Mayer & Sauer, 2017; Villa,
2017). To a lesser extent, the French “Manif pour Tous”
has sometimes used a populist toolkit, especially at the
height of its opposition to François Hollande’s govern-
ment, and dissenting voices split up to create the Print-
emps français (French Spring), presented as an emula-
tion of the recent Arab Spring (Perreau, 2016). Similarly,
in countries like Russia, Poland, Hungary or Italy, actors
behind anti-gender campaigns are closely connected to
the political parties in power (which are often considered
as populists), turning to some extent the struggle against
“gender ideology” into a state policy (Graff & Korolczuk,
2018; Kováts & Pető, 2017; Moss, 2017).
Second, central elements of anti-gender and right-
wing populist discourses look alike, as indicated by ex-
amples from three recent debates in which right-wing
populists were vocal: skepticism towards European in-
tegration, national and racial anxieties, and resistances
to globalization. Right-wing populists equally attack the
so-called Brussels elites and oppose their skepticism
on the European project, sometimes denounced as a
form of neo-colonialism, to the authenticity of national
sovereignty. The nostalgia of a lost golden age, when ev-
erything was simpler, also nourishes a quest for firmer
foundations at the time everything is seen as disappear-
ing, which means nature and the nation (Villa, 2017).
These debates often intersect with fears about national
and racial identities, particularly in the context of the
so-called refugee crisis and a global discussion about Is-
lam, which profoundly interrogates European secularism
(Bracke, 2013; Scott, 2009). These discourses also reflect
demographic anxieties, which are particularly strong in
Russia and parts of Eastern Europe, and connect to the
worries about what it means to be French, German
or Polish in a globalized world. This explains—in both
discourses—the specific focus on the child as the future
of the nation. Similarly, opposition to specific forms of
parenting, kinship and reproduction partly ensues from
worries about the (re)production of the nation (Fassin,
2014; Perreau, 2016). In some cases, these are not only
debates about national identities, but also about the col-
lective destiny of Europe, understood as the standard-
bearer of civilization, often in opposition to Islam.
Third, these discourses employ similar rhetorical
mechanisms, identified byWodak (2015, p. 4) as the nec-
essary toolkit of populist rhetoric: victim-perpetrator re-
versal, scapegoating, and the construction of conspiracy
theories. They rely on the:
“Politics of fear”, which seeks to instill the fear of real
or imagined dangers while instrumentalizing minori-
ties or other social groups to create scapegoats, and
play on emotional registers “to raise the affects of the
people and arouse their immediate feelings”. (Ben-
veniste, Campani, & Lazaridis, 2016, p. 12)
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As pointed out by Müller (2016), both discourses cannot
be disproven, and rely heavily on the idea of common
sense, as opposed to elitist knowledge.
Fourth, repertoires of action crucially resemble each
other. Anti-gender activists and right-wing populists
make skillful use of social media, which they also employ
as a critique of traditional media, often denounced as be-
ing kidnapped by “corrupt elites” and as such unworthy
and fake (Pajnik & Sauer, 2017). They rely heavily (and
rather successfully) on the use of referenda (e.g., Slove-
nia, Croatia, Slovakia), and petition political authorities
to initiate a referendum in other countries (e.g., France).
Both types of activisms claim to give a voice back to
the people.
5. Disentangling Anti-Gender Campaigns from
Right-Wing Populism
All this may give the impression that anti-gender cam-
paigns are just another component of rising right-wing
populism in Europe. However, in the remainder of this
section, we try to develop a more complex understand-
ing of these encounters. Because of the four reasons dis-
cussed below, we argue that, despite the crucial role
played by right-wing populism in several European coun-
tries, these two phenomena should not be conflated
with each other, for instance by considering them as two
faces of the same coin. They should rather be disentan-
gled in order to understand how they resonate and/or in-
teract with each other and may significantly contribute
to their mutual development. This alternative research
strategy would also allow a better understanding of the
specificities of each enterprise.
First, despite a lack of conceptual clarity and the
variety of definitions and understandings of populism
(Priester, 2012; Taggart, 2000), a historical perspective
unveils the different roots of these projects. As we have
shown, “gender ideology” was born out of a Catholic
project and first responded to specific concerns within
the Church. It takes its roots in contemporary debates
within Catholicism as well as from the project of New
Evangelization. As such, it is not originally linked with
right-wing populist ideology. Furthermore, as empha-
sized by Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy (2016), the rela-
tions between right-wing populism and religion are not
straightforward. Right-wing populism is not a religious
phenomenon and, as highlighted by these authors, the
instrumentalization of religion may happen in extremely
different ways within specific political projects. In such a
context, right-wing populists may have used the “gender
ideology” discourse without being aware of its Catholic
roots. One should also not overlook that the Catholic
Church has historically maintained uneasy relations with
right-wing populism, as illustrated by a 2017 article pub-
lished in the Jesuit journal La Civiltà Cattolica. Written by
clergymen belonging to Pope Francis’s close circle, it ex-
plicitly mentions Donald Trump and Steve Bannon and
denounces the “surprising” alliance between “Evangel-
ical Fundamentalism” and “Catholic Integralism” in the
United States (Spadaro & Figueroa, 2017).
Second, unlike defenders of “gender ideology”, right-
wing populists do not necessarily oppose gender and sex-
ual equality.6 For instance, as widely discussed in the
literature on femo- and homonationalism (e.g., Bracke,
2012; Farris, 2017; Mepschen, Duyvendak, & Tonkens,
2010), some actors labeled as right-wing populists have
increasingly endorsed women’s and LGBT rights, espe-
cially in Northern Europe. This is particularly true when
these rights are used to stigmatize specific populations
like migrants and people with a Muslim background.
Third, anti-gender campaigns are not restricted to Eu-
rope and locating them-that means looking at the forms
they take in different parts of the world-further con-
tributes to a more complex analysis. Latin America is the
other world region where this war on gender is waged in-
tensively. Debates on “gender ideology” actually started
earlier in this part of the world (Corrêa, 2018), but mass
demonstrations against gender only appeared in the last
years (e.g., Corrêa, 2017; Miskolci & Campana, 2017;
Viveros Vigoya & Rodríguez Rondón, 2017). As claimed
in a recent piece authored with Sonia Corrêa (Corrêa,
Kuhar, & Paternotte, 2018):
The populism analytical frame, so common in Euro-
pean and the US, is inappropriate to study mobiliza-
tions in Latin America. Indeed, populist imaginaries
and practices have long been deeply ingrained in the
regional political culture.
Consequently, “populism has no side” and cannot be eas-
ily mapped onto the left-right divide in the region” (Lav-
inas, 2017; see also Grigera, 2017). Moreover, ongoing
research highlights a distinctive set of actors. The role
of Evangelicals in the region and their unprecedented
collaboration with Catholics cannot be overlooked. Re-
search on countries like Brazil (Miskolci, 2018) reveals
even more complex constellations including ambitious
politicians, extreme-right activists, center-liberals con-
necting their opposition to the state to anti-gender ar-
guments, middle-class campaigners longing for social or-
der and transnationally connected Jewish right-wing ac-
tivists. In brief, locating anti-gender mobilizations in a
specific setting and comparing them to similar devel-
opments in other parts of the world reminds us that
populism designates different realities across the globe
(Hadiz & Chryssogelos, 2017), while it unveils more com-
plex sets of anti-gender actors.
Finally, anti-gender campaigns should not be re-
stricted to the right, especially as left-wing leaders have
endorsed this struggle in different parts of the world.
6 This is also true of the Catholic Church and religion more generally. Religious actors do not necessarily oppose gender and sexuality rights because
of their faith or their doctrine, and several religious denominations (including Catholicism) are currently experiencing fierce internal debates on
these issues.
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Again, a comparison with Latin America is insightful. In
that region, anti-gender campaigns are no monopoly of
the right and the leftist Ecuadorian president Rafael Cor-
rêa was one of the first to attack “gender ideology”. As
early as 2013, he denounced it as an instrument aimed at
destructing the family in one of his weekly TV programs.
More recently, the Mexican leader López Obrador won
the general elections in coalition with the Evangelical
party Encuentro social, that opposes “gender ideology”.
However, left-wing support to mobilizations against
“gender ideology” are no Latin American exception, and
similar cases are found in Europe. In France, the Socialist
Party has always been divided on LGBT issues, particu-
larly in relation to family rights, and reproductive tech-
nologies more generally. During same-sex marriage de-
bates, several leaders such as former Primeministers Ro-
card and Jospin openly disavowed the government, and
Jospin’s wife, Sylviane Agacinski, was even invoked as a
reference by anti-gender activists (Borrillo, 2017; Pater-
notte, 2018; Perreau, 2014). Sara Garbagnoli has also de-
scribed how important Marxists voices in Italy have pub-
licly endorsed anti-gender claims (2017, p. 166).
6. Conclusion
This article examines the development of campaigns
against “gender ideology” in Europe, leading to the emer-
gence of a specific family of social movements that we
call anti-gender campaigns. These campaigns started as
a Catholic project in reaction to the results of the UN con-
ferences of Cairo and Beijing in the mid-1990s. In sev-
eral European countries, this movement developed sig-
nificantly after various encounters with right-wing pop-
ulism, expanding far beyond its original Catholic cradle.
While recognizing the importance of these crossovers,
we contend the interpretation that mobilizations against
“gender ideology” and right-wing populism are the two
faces of the same coin, and we plead for a more complex
understanding of the ways in which distinct—and some-
times competing—projects can actually converge in spe-
cific settings.
The example of anti-gender campaigns helps us illus-
trate and substantiate the argument we want to make:
research on the so-called “Global RightWing” should dis-
entangle the various components of this phenomenon,
and locate them in concrete settings. The concept of
“Global Right Wing” (Bob, 2012) is indeed far too vague
to be meaningful, and current debates in academia, ac-
tivism and policy circles in Europe and the United States
often conflate different projects under such an overarch-
ing label. This prevents us from examining how diverse
actors, discourses and strategies can interact with each
other, and obscures our understanding of what is cur-
rently at stake.
Disentangling these various phenomena, as we do
with campaigns against “gender ideology” and right-wing
populism, appears as a more fruitful research strategy,
which allows us to grasp the specificities of each project
and the ways in which they interact with each other.
As we have demonstrated, it permits us to understand
the history and the main features of these mobilizations,
which are intimately connected to the Roman Catholic
Church, as well as to unveil the crucial role played by in-
tersections with rising right-wing populism.
Moreover, locating the “Global Right” in concrete
settings allows us to analyze the specific forms taken
by the various oppositions to women’s and LGBT rights
and, as already mentioned, to distance ourselves from
overarching ideas such as a global export of US culture
wars (e.g., Kaoma, 2009, 2012). While European actors
are connected to US ones in various ways, such an ap-
proach usually overlooks the home-grown roots of the
phenomenon, the forms it takes in different settings (Oz-
zano & Giorgi, 2015), and the specificities of the vari-
ous transcontinental and transnational networks being
established on these issues (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017,
pp. 253–271).
This research strategy also permits a better un-
derstanding of the forms taken by the same type
of opposition—here campaigns against “gender
ideology”—in other settings. Indeed, while the latter are
undoubtedly a global project, they take a flavor which is
often specific to the context. For instance, in Russia and
the countries under its influence, the Russian Orthodox
Church and the Kremlin play an active role in the develop-
ment of these campaigns, turning what is usually a social
movement into a state policy. Similarly, in Latin America,
specific forms of encounters, this time betweenCatholics
and Evangelicals, contribute to the success of these mo-
bilizations, while the connections with populism—which
has a totally different history andmeaning in the region—
are less obvious. Therefore, if a global or a transnational
perspective is needed to highlight cross-border similar-
ities, a comparative approach sheds new light on the
domestic reception of these transnational trends, and
addresses the impact of national and local factors on the
circulation of discourses, strategies, actors, etc.
To conclude, these reflections invite us to move be-
yond a rather naïve and teleological account of gender
and sexual politics, particularly in contemporary Europe.
Scholars, observers and actors alike were generally con-
vinced that Europe was on an unstoppable way toward
“full” gender equality and sexual citizenship. They as-
sumed that such forms of opposition were largely for-
eign to the European experience or could only subsist
as remains of the past, primarily in Eastern Europe or in
Catholic countries such as Italy or Ireland. The develop-
ment of anti-gender movements in a large number of Eu-
ropean countries, both East and West, has largely invali-
dated this understanding of sexual politics. The amend-
ment of this understanding should not, however, pro-
pel us into another grand narrative: the one of a global
and unqualified backlash against everything achieved in
terms of gender and sexuality in the last decades.
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